National Coalition For School Bus Safety
National Coalition For School Bus Safety
 

NOTES ON NTSB PUBLIC MEETING OF 9-21-99 ON HIGHWAY SPECIAL INVESTIGATION: BUS CRASHWORTHINESS

My initial impression of the meeting is that the NTSB report will be flawed but more useful than not.

The language of the conclusions and recommendations is particularly useful while the presentation by staff and subsequent remarks during the press conference by staff and Mr. Osterman were negative towards seat belts on school buses.

First the good news:

The conclusions and recommendations related to school buses are these:

  1. In the accidents analyzed for this special investigation, school bus passengers who remained within the seating compartment but not within the intrusion area during the accident sequence were less likely to have been seriously injured than passengers who were out of the compartment before the collision or who were propelled from the compartment during the collision.
  2. Because of compartmentalization, school bus passengers are safer now than they were before 1977.
  3. Current compartmentalization is incomplete in that it does not protect school bus passengers during lateral impacts with vehicles of large mass and n rollovers, because in such accidents, passengers do not always remain completely within the seating compartment.
  4. All potential designs for occupant protection systems to be used on school buses should be tested to uniform performance standards developed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to ensure occupant safety.
  5. It cannot be determined whether the current design of available restraint systems for large school buses would have reduced the risk of injury to the school bus passengers in the accidents simulated for this special investigation.
  6. The potential exists for an occupant protection system to be developed that would protect school bus passengers in most accident scenarios.
  7. One of the primary causes of preventable injury in motorcoach accidents involving a rollover, ejection, or both is occupant motion out of the seat during a collision when no intrusion occurs into the seating area.
  8. The overall injury risk to occupants in motorcoach accidents involving rollover and ejection may be reduced significantly by retaining the occupant in the seating compartment throughout the collision.
  9. New occupant protection systems for motorcoaches should be tested to uniform performance standards developed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration that are based on actual crash testing of motorcoaches to ensure occupant safety.
  10. Equipping motorcoach side windows with advanced glazing may decrease the number of ejections of unrestrained passengers during motorcoach accidents and decrease the risk of serious injuries to restrained passengers during motorcoach accidents.
  11. Because the increased size of passenger windows in motorcoaches may affect roof strength, rollover strength standards must be developed to take into account the effect of typical window dimensions.
  12. The Department of Transportation does not have standard definitions or classifications for the various bus types.
  13. The Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS) is not a reliable source for identifying the number of fatal occupant ejections in motorcoaches.
  14. The incorporation of bus identification into the vehicle identification number and the expansion of the use category will correct some of the inaccuracies of the FARS data, but without standard definitions and accurate classification of buses within FARS, incomplete data and inaccuracies will still exist.
  15. The Model Minimum Uniform Crash Criteria do not provide specific enough guidance to the States of bus body type coding.
  16. School bus accident injury data are incomplete, and, therefore, injuries cannot be reliably estimated.
  17. The use of onboard recorders may help reduce the accident rates of vehicle fleets.
  18. On-board recorders are needed to provide quantitative data to evaluate the dynamics of bus crashes.
  19. Establishing on-board recording standards for highway vehicles will provide a necessary foundation for the future use of on-board recorders.

Safety Recommendations

To the Department of Transportation

  1. In one year and in cooperation with bus manufacturers, complete the development of standard definitions and classifications for each of the different bus body types, and include these definitions and classifications in the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards.
  2. Once the standard definitions and classifications for each of the different bus types have been established in the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, in cooperation with the National; Association of Governor’s Highway Safety Representatives, amend the Model Minimum Uniform Crash Criteria’s bus configuration coding to incorporate the FMVSS definitions and standards.
  3. To the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

  4. In two years, develop performance standards for school bus occupant protection systems that account for frontal impact collisions, side impact collisions, rear impact collisions, and rollovers.
  5. Once pertinent standards have been developed for school bus occupant protection systems, require newly manufactured large school buses to have an occupant crash protect5ion system that meets the newly developed performance standards and retains passengers, including those in child restrain systems, within the seating compartment throughout the accident sequence for all accident scenarios.
  6. In 2 years, develop performance standards for motorcoach occupant protection systems that account for frontal impact collisions, side impact collisions, rear impact collisions, and rollovers.
  7. Once pertinent standards have been developed for motorcoach occupant protection systems, require newly manufactured motorcoaches to have an occupant crash protection system that meets the newly developed performance standards and retains passengers, including those in child restraint systems, within the seating compartment throughout the accident sequence for all accident scenarios.
  8. Expand your research on current advanced glazing to include its applicability to motorcoach occupant ejection prevention, and revise window glazing requirements for newly manufactured motorcoaches based on the results of this research.
  9. In 2 years, develop performance standards for motorcoach roof strength that provide maximum survival space for all seating positions and that take into account current typical motorcoach window dimensions.
  10. Once performance standards have been developed for motorcoach roof strength, require newly manufactured motorcoaches to meet those standards.
  11. Modify your methodology to collect accurate, timely, and sufficient data on passenger injuries resulting from school bus accidents so that thorough assessments can be made relating to school bus safety.
  12. Require that all school buses and motorcoaches manufactured after January 1, 2003 , be equipped with on-board recording systems that record vehicle parameters, including, at a minimum, crash pulses for determining bus body motion. (Additional recorder parameters will be added. The additional language will be presented to the Board for approval at a later date.)
  13. Develop and implement, in cooperation with other Government agencies and industry, standards for on-board recording of bus crash data that address, at a minimum, parameters to be recorded, data sampling rates, duration of recording, interface configurations, data storage format, incorporation of fleet management tools, fluid immersion survivability, fire survivability, independent power supply, and ability to accommodate future requirements and technological advances.
  14. To the National Association of Governor’s Highway Safety Representatives

  15. In conjunction with the Department of Transportation, amend the Model Minimum Uniform Crash Criteria’s bus configuration coding to comply with standard definitions and classifications of buses.
  16. To the bus manufacturers

  17. Cooperate with the Department of Transportation in the development of standard definitions and classifications fort each of the different bus body types.

On to the bad news:

The staff focused on the potential for lap belt and lap/shoulder belt induced injuries. This position is based on their computer simulations. Essentially, they are saying that in a large bus the passengers at the front and rear of the bus are sufficiently far from the center of gravity of the bus that they are subjected to severe forces when the bus rotates. Further, they say that those forces pinion the pelvis to the seat and impart a whip like motion to the upper body which results in high head loadings taking place. They posit that these loadings will cause injury. (This is the same argument that has been used against seat belts for years, but there are no significant real world instances where belts have caused these kinds of head injuries. Or where the passenger would have suffered much worse injuries without the belt.)

Interestingly, they also say that the sideways forces experienced by these passengers will result in even lap/shoulder belted passengers being subjected to similar whip like head loadings because the passenger who is thrown toward the aisle will slip out of the upper body restraint and will then be subject to similar forces as the lap belted passenger. (The passenger will slip out of the shoulder belt when thrown toward the aisle because shoulder belts go over the outboard shoulder.)

Dr. Yeager points out that while it may be true that passengers farther from the center of gravity will be subjected to strong rotational forces, passengers on a spinning small bus will probably suffer similar forces because the crash pulse is stronger in the lighter vehicle.

Mr. Osterman confirmed that the NTSB had looked aggressively for belt induced injuries in large buses and was unable to find any.

The computer modeling on which so many of the negative remarks about lap and lap/shoulder belts are based may or may not be accurate. Some of the software used was provided/developed by NHTSA which has been obstructionist at best. The initial technical draft we were able to review was appalling in its inaccuracies and inconsistencies. It is possible that the staff has cleaned up the report, but we won’t know until we see the published report in 2-3 months.

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